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T h e s e s
1. The metallurgic sector, like the east-west transit of energy raw
materials, is a strategic source of revenue for Ukraine. Over the
last ten years, this sector has become KievÕs most important
source of foreign currency inflows, accounting for over 40 per
cent of its total export revenues. The growth of metallurgic pro-
duction, which has continued almost without interruption since
the mid-1990s, has contributed considerably to the increase in
GDP which Ukraine showed in 2000, for the first time in its inde-
pendent history.
2. The sectorÕs economic results improved over recent years in
spite of the crisis affecting the machine building industry (includ-
ing the armaments industry), the traditional buyer of metallurgic
goods. The success of UkraineÕs metallurgy sector resulted from
the relatively favourable overseas economic situation in the late-
1990s and the dynamic growth of exports. An important role was
also played by the authoritiesÕ policy of granting the metallurgic
industry a series of tax rebates in 1999 as part of the so-called
economic experiment in the sector. Facing both the decline in the
world economic situation and the Ukrainian metallurgy sectorÕs
dependence on foreign markets, the authorities in Kiev have cho-
sen to continue their original policy of favouring this sector. The
importance of metallurgic exports for Ukraine could be compared
to the importance of energy raw material exports for Russia.
3. As this sector of industry is so attractive, owing to its immense
export revenues, it has quickly found itself in the hands of new
owners, who have usually been affiliated to the enterprisesÕ orig-
inal managers. Over recent years, local industrial-financial
groups (IFGs) have been playing an increasingly important role.
The IFGs include such organisations as Industrialnyi Soyuz
Donbassa, Metallurhiya or Interpipe, within which the consolida-
tion of the sectorÕs enterprises is taking place. The evolution of
the IFGs has followed the model of their Russian counterpartsÕ
development, in trying to form conglomerates of establishments
with complete, closed production cycles. 
4. Even though the presence of Russian investors in local ferrous
metallurgy is relatively small, Russia plays a very important role
in this sector of UkraineÕs economy. It remains an important mar-
ket for the local metallurgic industry and its key co-operator. As
the production volumes of Ukrainian metallurgy grow, the demand
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for (and consequently the dependence on) Russian raw materials
grows as well. The Ukrainian IFGs doing business in this sector
often have no choice but to co-operate with their more potent
Russian counterparts. 
5. The Ukrainian IFGs, who are now the main investors in the
market, are restructuring the enterprises that they control Ð but
too slowly, thus failing to meet the entire sectorÕs needs. Also,
this restructuring first and foremost consists in investments in
those undertakings which export their products. Meanwhile,
degradation of production potential is progressing in line with
technological obsoleteness, and the gap between the sector and
its foreign competitors is widening. Consequently, the industry
calls for enormous investments. The transformation model imple-
mented so far, and the conservative policy of the state, seem to
form astrategy of half-measures, which impedes deeper reforms
and blocks the influx of foreign investments. 
6. Each major IFG has its own political backup in the authorities
at regional or national level, depending on the scale of its invest-
ments. In recent years, the symbiosis of the political and busi-
ness portions of the IFGs has brought about rises and falls of par-
ticular business empires, as their respective political patrons
ascended to power and then lost it. Metallurgy being the basic
source of economic and political influence in Ukraine, the model
of development that the sector has been implementing so far has
contributed to the maintenance of the oligarchic political and eco-
nomic system in Ukraine. 
1. The importance of metallurgy
for UkraineÕs economy
The development of the metallurgic industry in Ukraine dates
back to the 19 th century, when numerous deposits of iron ore and
coal were discovered. This was associated with the accelerated
economic development taking place in tsarist Russia at the turn
of the 20th century. The former empty expanses in south-east
Ukraine underwent rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. The
shape of subsequent Soviet investments in UkraineÕs metallurgy
was determined by the fact that Ukraine was one of the only three
Soviet republics that had large deposits of iron ore, the other two
being Russia and Kazakhstan. Heavy industry in the USSR was
developed rapidly; this led to the further industrialisation of
Ukraine, which became the USSRÕs leading industrial centre, as
well as its ÔgranaryÕ, and developed aferrous metallurgy potential
that was comparable to that of Russia1.
The break-up of the USSR gave rise to deep recession, and
brought about changes in the structure of the former Soviet
republicsÕ industry. It also caused abreakdown of trade between
the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. This
resulted in a dramatic decline in demand for steel products. Due
to the drop in both domestic sales and sales to the traditional CIS
markets, the output of steel products began to decrease, which
process continued in Ukraine until the mid-1990s2. As a result of
the decline in goods trade within the CIS, its member countries
reoriented their exports and found new foreign markets in other
countries. 
The output of Ukrainian metallurgy has been growing since 1996,
this growth being disturbed only once in 1998, when the ferrous
metallurgy sector showed a decline of nearly 7 percent. The
results for 2000 were particularly impressive: ferrous metallurgy
output increased by 20.7 per cent and the output of non-ferrous
metallurgy grew 18.8 percent, these figures being much higher
than the production growth indexes for industry in general (12.9
per cent). Preliminary data show that production output contin-
ued to grow in 2001, although in the second half of the year the
dynamics of this growth slowed down. According to the
International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI), in 2000 (as in 1999)
Ukraine was the worldÕs 7 th largest steel producer3.
These figures improved despite the crisis affecting the machine
building industry and the armaments industry, the basic con-
sumers of metallurgic products, which continued until the late
1990s. This was possible owing to a systematic growth in
exports, which took advantage of the favourable pricing situation
in world at that time. Conditions for exports improved further fol-
lowing the devaluation of the Ukrainian currency after the 1998
financial crisis. The policy of favouring the metallurgic sector
implemented by Kiev also played a role in the growth in exports. 
Exports account for adominant portion (about 80 per cent) of the
Ukrainian metallurgic sectorÕs total sales. This structure is
a reversal of the sales structure of other leading metallurgic pro-
ducers. In the 1990s, sales to various countries of the world grew
at the expense of supplies to the CIS markets4. The main direc-
tions of expansion (as in the case of other producers from the
CIS) included the Middle East, Latin America and countries in
Asia and Africa. These destinations accept about 70 per cent of
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Ukrainian metallurgyÕs exports. Apart from finished rolled prod-
ucts (pipes, rails, sheet metal, fixtures, profiles and so on)
Ukraine exports iron ore, ferroalloys, cast iron, a growing propor-
tion of semi-finished products, and metal scrap. According to the
IISI, in 2000, Ukraine was the worldÕs fifth largest exporter of
steel products, and (due to its scarce imports) the third largest net
exporter after Russia and Japan5. Due to the increased volumes of
exports and the dynamic growth of production, the share of fer-
rous and non-ferrous metallurgy in the total value of industrial
production grew three times over the last decade, from 12.1 to
nearly 30 per cent. In 2000, the dynamic growth of industrial pro-
duction, which increased 12.9 per cent, contributed to the first
increase in GDP in the history of independent Ukraine. 
The metallurgic sector in Ukraine comprises several hundred
enterprises, including 14 steelworks, 7 pipe factories, metal
plants, iron ore production and enrichment plants, 3 ferroalloy
establishments, 16 coke processing plants, 20 non-ferrous 
metallurgy plants and 35 plants dealing with secondary metallur-
gy of iron and non-ferrous metals6. These industrial establish-
ments, especially the non-ferrous metallurgy plants, are scat-
tered all over the country.
The ferrous metallurgy potential, including the largest establish-
ments, is concentrated in the four South-east oblasts (provinces)
of Ukraine. The DnipropetrovsÕk oblast produces over 80 per cent
of the countryÕs iron ore, the basic raw material for steelmaking.
The other necessary raw material, coke, is produced mainly in the
DonetsÕk oblast, and in the countryÕs largest mining and metal-
lurgic complex in Kryvyi Rih (the DnipropetrovsÕk oblast). Almost
100 per cent of UkraineÕs steel is produced in the following dis-
tricts: the DonetsÕk oblast (14 million tons, i.e. over 44 per cent
of total domestic production), the DnipropetrovsÕk oblast (10.2
million tons, i.e. 32.2 per cent), the Zaporizhia oblast (4.4 million
tons, i.e. 14 per cent) and the LuhansÕk oblast (2.9 million tons,
i.e. 9 per cent). Most steel (about 70 per cent) is produced by the
following industrial complexes: Kryvorizhstal of Kryvyi Rih, the
Mariupol Illich MMK and Azovstal (DonetsÕk oblast), Zaporizhstal
of Zaporizhia (Zaporizhia oblast) and AMK of AlchevsÕk (LuhansÕk
oblast). The production of cast iron and rolled steel products is
also concentrated in these districts, as well as in the so-called
Ôgreat fiveÕ steelworks7. These five establishments are included in
the list of the worldÕs eighty largest producers of steel for 2000 as
compiled by the IISI8. The production of pipes is concentrated in
the DnipropetrovsÕk oblast, where four of UkraineÕs seven facto-
ries are located. 
Companies from the metallurgic sector lead the rankings of
Ukrainian enterprises, which is published each year by the
Ukrainskaya Investitsionnaya Gazeta weekly. Among the top 100
enterprises with the highest incomes in 2000, 24 were establish-
ments from the metallurgy sector, in addition to a further dozen
or so intermediaries that trade metallurgic products. In the top
ten, as many as six entities were associated with metallurgy. The
importance of the metallurgic sector is illustrated even better by
the ranking of top exporters. In the top ten, there is only one com-
pany not directly associated with metallurgy9.
The proportion of metallurgic exports in UkraineÕs total exports is
comparable to the proportion of its energy raw materials imports
in total imports. The value of the 2000 imports of the so-called
Ômineral productsÕ, which include Russian gas and oil, exceeded
US$6.5 billion and accounted for about 47 per cent of the total
value of goods imports. On the other hand, UkraineÕs exports of
metals and metal products generated revenues of about US$6.5
billion, which accounted for as much as 44.4 per cent of total
export revenues. The proceeds from metallurgic exports exceed
UkraineÕs total income from transit services (nearly US$3.5 bil-
lion in 2000), including the transit of gas and oil (nearly US$2 bil-
lion)10. In recent years, it has been proved that metallurgic exports
are not only the motor of UkraineÕs entire economy, which is
focused around heavy industry, but also the main source of for-
eign currency proceeds. For Ukraine, the importance of metallur-
gy is comparable to the importance of energy raw materials for
Russia.
2. Metallurgy Ð the economic
link in the oligarchic power 
s y s t e m
Metallurgy is one of the basic sources of economic influence, and
consequently of political power, in Ukraine. The model of develop-
ment which the sector has been implementing so far reflects the
development of the oligarchic political and economic system that
has been forming in Ukraine since the early 1990s.
The main entities around which the sector is consolidating are the
Ukrainian interest groups frequently referred to as industrial-
financial groups (IFG)11. These groupsÕ expansion is conditioned
by political protectionism, the scope of which corresponds to the
scale of individual IFGsÕ investments. This protectionism gives
the IFGs aprivileged position in relation to foreign investors. This
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is their basic asset in their rivalry with Russian capital, but at the
same time it is one of the fundamental barriers that impede
major Western investments. 
The first Ukrainian IFGs began to form back in the early 1990s.
For many of them, the basic capital necessary for development
turned out to be not finance per se but rather ÔassetsÕ, such as the
power to influence the authorities, from the managers of particu-
lar state-owned enterprises to the regional authorities (who
shape the economic and political lives of the Ukrainian pro-
vinces), and to the political elites in Kiev. As a result of this sym-
biosis between political power in the state and economic power
in the economy (especially in metallurgy), many leading IFGs
have risen and fallen in recent years as their political patrons
gained and lost power.
The political backup of the largest Ukrainian IFGs includes the
highest state authorities. One example of this is the United Energy
Systems of Ukraine (UESU) corporation, which was promoted
from 1996 to 1997 by then Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko. It is
typical that in addition to making business investments, particu-
lar IFGs have ÔinvestedÕ in political parties and parliamentary fac-
tions. Ô We say Hromada, we think UESUÕ, wrote the Kiev press
four years ago, referring to the links that existed between the
party chaired by Pavlo Lazarenko and the then most potent 
private commercial organisation in Ukraine12. Trubova Ukraina
[ÔPipe UkraineÕ] was the spiteful nickname of Trudova Ukraina,
the second largest parliamentary faction (after the communists)
in the Verkhovna Rada of the previous term (1998Ð2002), which
was associated with the steel pipe trader Interpipe. The political
and business environment of the group, which was affiliated to the
Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) and which invested in
a number of industries, including metallurgy, is sometimes referred
to as the Social Democratic Holding.
The scope of these political and business formationsÕ influence in
the state is very broad, and is not limited to politics or the econ-
omy (and in the economy, it is not limited to metallurgy). The
IFGsÕ owners and political patrons are commonly referred to as
oligarchs, as in Russia. They control the largest media, which are
in a way ÔcursedÕ to dependence on such investors owing to the
economic weakness of the state and the narrowness of the
advertising market (this being one of the main barriers that
impede the development of independent media in the post-Soviet
area). The media serve their owners by lobbying for economic
projects profitable for the latter, and they serve the IFGsÕ political
protectors by promoting their political strategies. The evolution of
the Ukrainian IFGs has followed the pattern of their Russian coun-
terpartsÕ development, although the process is slightly retarded.
The importance of these political-business formations in Ukraine,
which are characteristic of nearly the entire post-Soviet area, is
comparable to the role that the Russian IFGs played during Boris
YeltsinÕs presidency. This model of development strengthens the
oligarchic system of power and retards reforms in the state. 
As the publicist Aleksandr Menshakov figuratively put it, the oli-
garchisation of the state on the regional level consists in the for-
mation of specific tiny ÔSoviet Socialist RepublicsÕ. Such ÔSSRsÕ,
managed jointly by the local administration and skilful economy
specialists who know how to evade taxes and profit their corpo-
rations, take control over more and more enterprises. Directors of
s t a t e-owned enterprises receive tempting proposals to co-o p e r a t e
with certain selected companies. If they accept these proposals
they keep their positions, but if not, they quit Ð in one way or
another. In this model, enterprises of entire regions function 
within certain corporations. It is unimportant, Menshakov argues,
which establishments have already been privatised and which
have not; the privatised gets to be controlled by publicly unknown
shareholders (usually through ÔforeignÕ companies with exotic
names, incorporated in equally exotic countries), and the state-
owned company starts to be managed by directors appointed by
the local clans and the IFGs associated with such clans. ÔIt is
obvious that no economic entity, after having undergone this kind
of ÔprivatisationÕ, will ever seriously participate in the market
auctions for coal or gas, in any other tenders or in the market
commercial exchange in general. What to sell or buy, how, or for
what price Ð all this will be dictated by some Gosplan of the
regional business-political structure(...)Õ13.
2.1. The DonetsÕk Group: 
Industrialnyi Soyuz Donbassa
For the Ukrainian publicist, a model example of a ÔregionalÕ IFG14
is Industrial Union of Donbass Corporation (IUD), the business link
of the so-called DonetsÕk clan, that is, a specific political-busi-
ness corporation which has gained control of the DonetsÕk oblast
(province), and is slowly expanding into other parts of Ukraine. 
The expansion of the DonetsÕk elite is linked to the regionÕs eco-
nomic potential (the region produces over fifty percent of the
countryÕs coal and nearly fifty percent of its coke and steel15). It
even ÔelevatedÕ Yukhym Zviahilskyi, one of the local leaders, to the
position of acting Prime Minister of Ukraine in autumn 1993. But
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the competing DnipropetrovsÕk clan soon reclaimed power in the
state. Changes at the top in Kiev brought about ZviahilskyiÕs rapid
resignation (1994), and he had to flee to Israel in an atmosphere
of scandal 16. The political ambitions of the DonetsÕk group were
curbed, and their activities were restricted to the regional level.
Since the mid-1990s, the DonetsÕk political-business elite has
been acting in line with the slogan Ôpolitics is done in Kiev, and
business in the DonbassÕ17. This policy has manifested itself in
the groupÕs unconditional political support for President Leonid
Kuchma. It return, the group has received an almost unlimited
right to carry out economic expansion in the region. 
As part of this expansion, between late 1995 and early 1996, the
Industrial Union of Donbass (IUD) corporation was established
with the ÔblessingÕ of the oblastÕs authorities. In 1996, Volodymyr
ScherbanÕ, the then governor of the DonetsÕk oblast, ordered the
industrial establishments of the region to break their relations
with all gas suppliers except for IUD. The latter soon became the
regionÕs new gas monopoly. IUD initially profited from the sup-
plies of Russian gas and settlements with the industrial gas con-
sumers (each year, the DonetsÕk district consumes a quantity of
gas comparable to the total gas consumption in Poland). In this
way, Governor ScherbanÕ was acting to the disadvantage of the
inter-regional UESU corporation favoured by Prime Minister Pavlo
Lazarenko18. ScherbanÕ was soon dismissed, and many represen-
tatives of the DonetsÕk business-political elites died in unclear
circumstances19. However, the expansion of UESU was stopped
following President KuchmaÕs unexpected dismissal of Prime
Minister Lazarenko in 199720. The DonetsÕk governorÕs seat was
offered to Viktor Yanukovych who is associated with the busi-
nessman Rinat Akhmetov who became the new informal leader of
the clan 21. Since that time, the IUD has taken control over ever
more enterprises, including Azovstal, the countryÕs third largest
metallurgic complex. According to the Ukrainian press, it controls
over 600 enterprises in the DonetsÕk and LuhansÕk districts at the
moment22. Very often, the bonds between IUD and the enterprises
it controls are informal. Khartsyzsk Tube Works
IUD is very confident in its relations with enterprises it does not
formally own. This may be attested by the concernÕs investments
in the modernisation of production lines at the pipe factory in
KhartsyzÕk (Khartsyzsk Tube Works, KTW) in the period preceding
its privatisation 23. As a result of this co-operation, in September
2001 IUD formally took over control of KTW, a CIS-area monopo-
list manufacturer of large-diameter (530Ð1420 mm) pipes with
a n t i -corrosion coating necessary in pipeline construction. 
IUD won the privatisation competition by offering 126 million
hryvnas (about US$25m), i.e. only 3 million hryvnas above the
upset price (and over 200 million hryvnas below the upset price
quoted in the first failed attempt to privatise KTW in 2000). With
over 6 billion hryvnas of revenues (over US$1 billion), IUD is
UkraineÕs second largest enterprise after the Naftohaz Ukrainy
complex24. The annual revenues of its partner companies (some-
times taken to be IUD ÔaffiliatesÕ), such as ARS, Danko or
DonetsÕkyi Industrialnyi Soyuz, account for another 8 billion hryv-
nas. For comparison, the 2000 GDP of Ukraine in current prices
amounted to about 173 billion hryvnas25. In 2000, IUD exported
products worth US$363m, which puts it fourth in the ranking of
UkraineÕs largest exporters26.
One of IUDÕs founders is Vitaly Haiduk, who was appointed
Minister of the Power Sector towards the end of 2001. Shortly
after taking office, Haiduk objected against the creditorsÕ
attempts to file apetition in bankruptcy against the Dniproenerho
energy plant. Dniproenerho is one of the entities that buy the gas
traded by IUD. Haiduk also suggested areduction in energy prices
for the key sectors of the economy; this just three days after his
superior, Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh, signed a regulation to
increase prices for industrial customers27. Haiduk said that he did
not know anything about the regulation, and even if it actually had
been signed, he did not support it [sic]. The next day, the Prime
Minister confirmed that the regulation had been passed, but
a day later President Leonid Kuchma ordered the government to
consider the idea of creating Ôan integrated fuel and energy
organisation for DonetsÕkÕ within which prices would be fixed on
special terms28. This example of relations between the Prime
Minister and his subordinate, and of the PresidentÕs subsequent
reaction, well illustrates the way in which the Ukrainian govern-
ment functions. It also shows how the DonetsÕk groupÕs position
in Kiev strengthened in 2001. 
The Ôpolitical pragmatismÕ of the DonetsÕk group is demonstrated
by the fact that the Regions Party, which represents the group, is
a member of the pro-presidential, nomenklatura and oligarchic
ÔZa Yedinu UkrainuÕ [One Ukraine] coalition formed for the 2002
parliamentary elections. Among other members, this coalition
includes the Trudova Ukraina party, which is affiliated to the
Interpipe group, which is in turn a business competitor of IUD.
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2.2. The DnipropetrovsÕk Group: 
UESU, Interpipe, Pryvatbank 
In the 1990s, the DonetsÕk clan lost the battle for power in Kiev
to the elites of another important Ukrainian economic centre, the
DnipropetrovsÕk oblast. The importance of DnipropetrovsÕk in
Ukraine dates back to the Soviet period, when the giant estab-
lishments of the Soviet armaments and space industry were cre-
ated there. The local nomenklatura was responsible for these
sectors, which were of key importance for the Soviet state. 
It administered them on behalf of Moscow, rather than Kiev,
which had an impact on both DnipropetrovsÕk Ôs importance in
the USSR (Leonid Brezhnev, among others, came from this dis-
trict), and the prospects for its development in independent
Ukraine. Owing to its more comprehensive experience, the
DnipropetrovsÕk group proved better prepared to take power in
Kiev than the DonetsÕk elite, which had been focused on the min-
ing and metallurgy ÔmonocultureÕ of the Donbass.
A number of UkraineÕs leading contemporary politicians come
from DnipropetrovsÕk, starting with President Leonid Kuchma
himself (who used to be a member of the management team of
Pivdenmash, the worldÕs largest space rocket factory29), to ex-
Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko (1996-7), former Deputy Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (2000), and to the influential deputies
Viktor Pinchuk and Serhiy Tyhybko. The DnipropetrovsÕk elites,
though, do not form amonolith like the DonetsÕk group. Following
the DnipropetrovsÕk groupÕs expansion in the 1990s, several cir-
cles of influence emerged around the most effectual and ambi-
tious representatives of the local clan. 
The Lazarenko Ð Ty m o s h e n ko duo created the United Energy
Systems of Ukraine (UESU) concern, an interregional IFG which is
currently UkraineÕs largest. It was established back in the mid-
1990s on the foundation provided by the DnipropetrovsÕk Ôfamily
businessÕ of the Tymoshenko family, the UkrainsÕkyi Benzyn cor-
poration30. In 1996-7, UESU controlled the most important sec-
tors of the economy and did business on a massive scale. Its
operations were not restricted to the territory of Ukraine, as is
evidenced by the numerous investigation proceedings pending in
Moscow and other places, which pertain to suspected transac-
tions worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and involving
Gazprom and the Russian defence department. According to
some sources, when UESUÕs power was at its peak (1997) the
corporation controlled a quarter of UkraineÕs economy31. UESU
throve on the protection provided by the Prime Minister as well as
the barter settlement schemes under lucrative gas supply con-
tracts (UESU briefly became UkraineÕs single largest private gas
importer). The successes ended with the fall of Pavlo LazarenkoÕs
government. At the moment, UESU is in a deep defensive posi-
tion, as are the creators of its power32. The remnants of the for-
mer empire, including its metallurgic assets, are gradually being
taken over by Yulia TymoshenkoÕs political and business competi-
tors. An example: until recently, the groupÕs companies controlled
the leading iron ore production and enrichment complex, the
Pivdennyi HZK in Kryvyi Rih. In summer 2001, three companies
from the UESU group (Lanata Trading, Lansin Commercial LTD
and Doleno Trading LTD, all registered in tax havens) which joint-
ly controlled over 60 per cent of HZK shares, were to be sold for
about US$50m to RussiaÕs LUKoil. But the Pryvatbank group
struck back with the assistance of the courts, and ultimately the
future of HZK remained unresolved33. In 2001 the Slovianskyi
bank, which had developed dynamically in the 1990s and formed
an important link in the IFG, was put into liquidation3 4. The history
of the expansion and fall of UESU and its political promoters is
a perfect illustration of the interdependence of UkraineÕs economy
and politics.
The ruins of UESU served as a foundation for the now leading
Ukrainian IFG, the Interpipe group. There is aspecial link between
its owner Viktor Pinchuk (one of the leaders of the Trudova
Ukraina parliamentary faction) and President Leonid Kuchma:
Pinchuk is the second husband of the PresidentÕs daughter, Olena
Franchuk (Franchuk being the name of her first husband, son of
the former Prime Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea).
For quite some time Pinchuk has been considered to be the most
influential oligarch in KuchmaÕs inner circle, amember of the so-
called Family (modelled on the Moscow ÔFamilyÕ that formed
around former Russian President Boris Yeltsin)
Interpipe was established back in 1990, but the period of its par-
ticularly rapid expansion followed LazarenkoÕs political crash and
UESUÕs economic breakdown. Interpipe gained control of a num-
ber of Eastern Ukrainian enterprises in 1999, the year of the last
presidential elections, during which PinchukÕs media empire
(which owns the countryÕs leading television, the ISTV, and Fakty
i Kommentarii, one of the largest national dailies) became one of
the main sponsors of Leonid KuchmaÕs presidential campaign35.
Even though PinchukÕs concern lost the battle for the CISÕ key-
importance pipe factory in KhartsyzÕk to the DonetsÕk IUD in
2001, InterpipeÕs business thrives on the manufacture and export
of steel pipes. The concerns controls most domestic pipe facto-
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ries, which are concentrated in the DnipropetrovsÕk district (like
the Nizhnedniprovsky Truboprokatny Zavod or the plants in
Novomoskovsk and Nikopol; in the course of restructurisation,
the latter one was transformed into a new enterprise named
Niko-Tube, which is now part of Interpipe). Interpipe also controls
some establishments in other CIS countries (including the plants
in the Belorussian Mogilev district). DnipropetrovsÕk is the seat of
the Kredyt-Dnipro bank, which is the groupÕs financial link.
Interpipe sells most of its products to countries in the CIS and
Central and Eastern Europe, the rest being sold to Western Europe,
America and Asia36. Through Kredyt-Dnipro, the group controls
the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plants, one of three such establishments in
Ukraine, as well as other enterprises. In 2000, Interpipe had the
tenth highest total revenues among Ukrainian companies 
(2.7 billion hryvnas or over US$500m in revenues; it was just
behind the national telecom operator, Ukrtelekom), the fifth
biggest exporter (just behind IUD at US$237m) and twenty-third
in the ranking of the most profitable companies (104 million hryv-
nas, i.e. about US$20m)37.
The Pryvatbank group is another important Ukrainian IFG with its
origins in DnipropetrovsÕk. The Pryvatbank and Interpipe groups
have more in common than their geographic origin, though, as
they are also affiliated in political and business terms.
Companies of the Pryvatbank group, like the other leading IFGs of
Ukraine, invest in various sectors of the economy; the most
important directions of their expansion include ferrous and non-
ferrous metallurgy. The Pryvatbank IFG is concentrated around
UkraineÕs leading private bank, AKB Pryvatbank, which was
established by other major entities of the group, namely Privat
Intertrading and Sentoza. It owes a lot to former Vice Prime
Minister Serhiy Tyhybko, an opponent of Yulia Tymoshenko and an
ally of Viktor Pinchuk. In 2000, Tyhybko was a member of the
ÔreformersÕ cabinetÕ of Viktor Yuschenko, but as a result of the
disputes around Deputy Prime Minister TymoshenkoÕs energy pol-
icy, Tyhybko resigned from the position of the Minister of Economy
and quit the government after several months. At that time, he
became one of TymoshenkoÕs main opponent and was shortly
elected chairman of PinchukÕs party, i.e. Trudova Ukraina38. In this
context it is hardly surprising that the Pryvatbank groupÕs 
companies struggled with the structures affiliated to Yu l i a
Tymoshenko for one of UkraineÕs largest ore enrichment plants,
the Pivdenniy HZK in Kryvyi Rih. 
2.3. The Social-Democratic holding
In 2000, a new fundamental requirement was introduced into the
privatisation procedure, namely the criterion of the so-called
industry investor with adequate experience and background in
the given industry. This was why the Metallurhia concern was
established in early 2000 for the purpose of taking part in the pri-
vatisation process. It represented the interests of a business
group associated with Hryhoriy Surkis, one of the leaders of the
Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) (SDPU(o)). Surkis
was also a political and business partner of Viktor Medvedchuk,
who until shortly before had been vice-chairman of the
Parliament. However, this groupÕs metallurgy holdings are less
extensive than the assets of IUD, and are expanding less dynami-
c a l l y than the DonetsÕk group and Interpipe have been doing
recently.
The Social-Democratic holding, as the political and business
environment of Surkis, Medvedchuk and the SDPU(o) is some-
times called, began its expansion into the fuel sector with the
Slavutych concern. Its main industrial assets include the
Zaporizhia Ferroalloys Plants, the Dneprospetstal complex39 and
a chain of regional energy enterprises. 
The ÔSocial DemocratsÕ own one of the most potent media
empires in Ukraine. Among other establishments, they control
Inter television, and influence Studio 1+1 (the two most popular
stations in Ukraine), as well as the popular capital city daily
Kievskiye Vedomosti. The media associated with this group have
been carrying out an incessant defamation campaign against
Viktor Yuschenko for nearly two years. Yuschenko exposed himself
to the ÔSocial DemocratsÕ displeasure in 2000, when as the gov-
ernmentÕs Prime Minister he undertook reforms in the energy
sector, then partly controlled by structures associated with
SDPU(o). The SDPU(o)Õs political position has been unstable
recently, which has manifested itself in the distance that formed
between the ÔSocial DemocratsÕ and the PresidentÕs formation,
and in Viktor MedvedchukÕs dismissal from the position of vice-
chairman of the Parliament. This does not bode well for the
potential future expansion of the Social-Democratic holding.
The results of the spring elections to the Verkhovna Rada may
strengthen or weaken particular groups of economic influence.
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2.4. The stateÕs policy towards 
the sector
The stateÕs policy towards the metallurgy sector is notable for the
implementation of the half-measures characteristic of Ukrainian
reforms in general. One such half-measure was the so-called tax
experiment in the sector. Previously, the stateÕs policy of support-
ing the metallurgy sector was not much different from its policies
towards other sectors. It included the practice of redeeming the
enterprisesÕ debts, while the state itself simultaneously failed to
regularly meet its own obligations towards metallurgy; one exam-
ple of this is the postponement of implementing acomprehensive
solution to the issue of VAT reimbursement to exporters, mostly
from the metallurgy sector.
The law ÔOn the performance of an experiment in the metallurgic
sector enterprisesÕ became effective on 1 July 1999. It provided
for a number of tax breaks and privileges for a selected number
(67) of steelworks, mines, ore enrichment plants, pipe factories
and so on. These measures were to remain in force until the end
of 2001. The establishments included in the experiment enjoyed
reduced profit tax rates (down to 9% in the first year and 15% in
subsequent years), reduced ecological charges (down to no more
than 0.15 per cent of their foreign currency expenditure),
redeemed fines for untimely payment of dues and taxes, and
reduced fine rates and contributions to the National Innovation
Fund by half. The ÔexperimentalÕ companies were also exempted
from charges for the construction, overhauls and maintenance of
roads40.
The sectorÕs situation improved considerably thanks to the tax
rebates, and one of the experimentÕs objectives was attained,
namely the financial liquidity and an improvement in the quality
of settlements in the sector (which, however, also resulted from
other economic reforms undertaken in 2000 aimed at limiting the
use of barter). The stateÕs total aid provided to the sector in 1999
and 2000, including rebates, redemption of fines, deferment of
tax payments etc., reached over 4.5 billion hryvnas (nearly
US$900m)41. As the volume of production increased dynamically
in the first phase of the experiment, the sectorÕs payments to the
budget began to increase. This continued until 2001 when,
according to UkraineÕs Tax Administration, many enterprises
began to show losses42.
The lobby associated with the major IFGs managed to extend the
duration of the experiment by pointing to the deteriorating eco-
nomic situation. On January 17, the Verkhovna Rada extended the
validity of the experiment law until the end of 200243. Opponents
have criticised the experiment as an example of unequal treat-
ment of economic entities and a threat to the budget. They have
also been arguing that extension of the experiment may cost the
budget 1 billion hryvnas (about US$200m), which amount will be
spent on the electoral campaign. Among other problems, this
argument refers to the fact that most enterprises in the sector are
controlled by the same industrial-financial groups which are affil-
iated to the pro-presidential Za Edinu Ukrainu electoral coalition. 
3. Foreign investment
The authoritiesÕ inconsistent economic policy, non-transparent
privatisation and a brand of protectionism that favours selected
domestic industrial-financial groups are barriers that deter seri-
ous foreign capital, and Western capital in particular, from invest-
ing in UkraineÕs metallurgy sector. Foreign capital has so far been
committed mainly to non-ferrous metallurgy and to smaller enter-
prises. In most cases, this commitment consists in the use of
local production resources on a tolling basis44. The only real
investors are the Russians, even though their commitment in the
metallurgy sector is relatively small compared to other sectors of
the Ukrainian economy (petroleum refinery in particular), and
focuses on non-ferrous metallurgy.
In March 2000, the Russky Alumini concern, acting through its
Ukrainian company, won the privatisation of the Myko l a i v
Aluminosilicate Plants that produces aluminosilicates, a semi-
finished product necessary for the production of aluminium, and
which is scarce in the CIS. The Russians, who had previously held
a block of shares, paid over US$100 million Ð arecord amount in
the history of Ukrainian privatisation Ð for the 30 per cent block
of the stateÕs shares in the enterprise which they needed to con-
trol it. A year later, 68.01 per cent of shares in UkraineÕs only alu-
minium plant in Zaporizhia (ZZA) were purchased by RussiaÕs
AvtoVAZ-Invest, a company associated with the automotive con-
cern in Togliatti Ð an entity which was naturally interested in the
ZZAÕs products. The only major Russian investment in ferrous
metallurgy was the takeover of the middle-size steelworks in
DonetsÕk by Metalsrussia45. The real scope of the RussiansÕ com-
mitment in UkraineÕs metallurgy sector is undoubtedly higher, but
at the same time it is difficult to verify because of the insufficient
transparency of ownership issues in Ukraine46.
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The RussiansÕ capital commitments on the one hand, and the key
importance of Russia for UkraineÕs metallurgy on the other, are
largely a legacy of the joint economic organism of the USSR and
the co-operational bonds that existed between enterprises of both
states (only 20 per cent of Ukrainian enterprises have production
cycles that are closed within the republicÕs limits4 7). Ru s s i a
remains the most important market for the Ukrainian producers
of the aluminosilicates necessary to produce aluminium, steel
pipes for the construction of gas and oil pipelines, etc. At the same
time Russia is the main supplier of gas, the importance of which
increases as production volumes in Ukraine grow (metallurgy and
the energy sector consume the largest quantities of this fuel). 
Russia is also important from the point of view of the leading
Ukrainian industrial-financial groupsÕ expansion, as their further
development is conditional not only on exports to the Eastern
market (as in the case of Interpipe), but also on joint Ukrainian-
Russian undertakings, including undertakings in third countries
(for example, IUD is an important partner for RussiaÕs Gazprom
as the main supplier of metal products for GazpromÕs deposit
preparation project in the Persian Gulf48). 
4. Principal developments 
and future prospects
For several years, Ukraine has been consistently taking measures
to re-attain the level of metallurgy outputs from the Soviet peri-
od. The growth in the metallurgy sectorÕs production has consid-
erably contributed to the improvement of the entire economyÕs
results. However, this growth was founded on the favourable eco-
nomic situation in foreign markets and the Kiev authoritiesÕ poli-
cy of favouring the sector, rather than on structural reforms in the
industry. Meanwhile, the successful development of exports also
has negative aspects.
The relation between domestic sales and sales in the foreign
markets is about 20 per cent to 80 per cent. The slight increase
in internal demand observed in 2000Ð2001 will not be enough to
compensate for the overseas markets. According to optimistic
forecasts, by 2010 the Ukrainian market will be able to absorb up
to 8 million tons of rolled products, i.e. as little as 35 per cent of
the present production volume. Because of such a deep depen-
dence on exports, Ukraine will remain exposed for many years to
fluctuations in the world economic situation which will affect the
volume of investments in the sector, GDP growth and the condi-
tion of UkraineÕs budget. In 2002, the export conditions for the
Ukrainian metallurgy enterprises will worsen. The declining eco-
nomic situation abroad will be combined with the prospect of
increased costs, owing to the expected growth of internal market
prices of gas, electricity, etc.
In the face of symptoms of a world-wide recession, which inten-
sified after 11 September 2001, the largest steel producers con-
cluded an initial agreement in December last year to reduce their
production resources by 10 per cent (about 100 million tons) by
2010. Ukraine refused to support this agreement, but it may
surely expect difficulties with export, especially of processed
products. The developed countries will try to protect their markets
from imports; this has already manifested itself in the decisions
taken by the US and EU in early spring 2002 to protect their
respective markets, the restrictions Russia imposed last year on
the import of Ukrainian steel pipes, and the ever more numerous
anti-dumping proceedings initiated against Ukrainian exporters. 
The structure of Ukrainian exports in terms of proportions of par-
ticular goods is especially unfavourable. Between 1995 and
2000, the proportion of cheap, low-processed products such as
cast iron and semi-finished products in foreign sales increased,
and the proportion of finished rolled products dropped. The trends
in the exports of developed countries are just the opposite, as
these countries try to sell highly processed, expensive products
abroad. By exporting cast iron, Ukraine is supporting its competi-
torsÕ raw materials base. In the opinion of experts, the competi-
tive advantage which Ukrainian metallurgy has so far enjoyed in
the world is precisely the consequence of the low level of pro-
cessing and low prices of its products. 
The potential of UkraineÕs metallurgy sector, developed back in
the Soviet period, is based on obsolete technologies, which
reflected the standards and needs of the extensively developing
Soviet economy. This determines the quality of the product
Ukrainian metallurgy offers today, as well as the above-men-
tioned resulting problems in the world markets. According to
some estimates, over 60 per cent the Ukrainian metallurgyÕs out-
put is based on obsolete technologies, and only 62 per cent of
Ukrainian metallurgy exports may be certified as complying with
international standards49.
In 2000, only 3.1 per cent of Ukrainian steel was produced in
electrical furnaces, while this modern melt technology accounted
for 14.6 per cent of Russian production, and an average 33.8 per
cent of world production. Fifty percent of Ukrainian steel is pro-
duced in open-hearth furnaces. This technology accounts for 27.4
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per cent of RussiaÕs production, and is almost completely out of
use in developed countries. However, there has been a certain
improvement: from 1998 to 2000 the proportion of steel produced
in the continuous casting system increased from 17.5 to 19.6 per
cent. But even so, Ukraine remains far behind its competition in
this respect (the continuous casting system accounts for 49.7 per
cent of production in Russia and 84.7 per cent of production in
the rest of the world)50.
The technological obsoleteness causes considerable raw materi-
al losses in the production process. Ukrainian metallurgy shows
higher raw material and energy consumption than the average in
developed countries. The consumption of steel per ton of finished
rolled products is 1.3 tons, compared to 1.25 tons in Russia, 1.18
tons in the US and 1.05 tons in Japan. The high energy con-
sumption level of most establishments exposes them to problems
as the prices of imported energy raw materials increase. The
prices of domestic coal and transport are another important fac-
tor. These prices, however, are shaped by the state, so the polit-
ical backup of UkraineÕs particular industrial-financial groups
plays its role here.
Apart from being a legacy of the USSRÕs Ômoon economyÕ, this
technological obsoleteness also results from low investments 
in the sector in the 1990s. Most of the local metallurgic under-
takings were established several decades ago, and many even
before the Second World War. Broad-scale investments ended
with the crisis and break-up of the USSR. The wear and tear of
fixed assets in early 2000 reached 63.1 per cent, and each year,
amortisation amounts to 3Ð3.5 billion hryvnas (US$550Ð650m);
reconstruction expenditures in 2000 amounted to just 1.6 billion
hryvnas, and even this was mainly due to the so-called econom-
ic experiment in the sector51. Meanwhile, restructurisation of the
sector would require investments at an estimated amount of 40-
50 billion hryvnas5 2 (US$8Ð10 billion). Such investments could be
only afforded by serious Western investors. This prospect, though,
appears unrealistic at the moment, because there is no will to
fundamentally change the stateÕs economic policy. Besides, most
of the sectorÕs enterprises have already been privatised. 
The improved results the sector showed in recent years were not
due to reforms, but rather to the favourable international eco-
nomic situation in the late 1990s, and to the policy of the author-
ities in Kiev who offered the metallurgy sector successive
restructurisations of debt and tax abatements instead of a com-
prehensive development strategy. Owing to these hothouse con-
ditions, the prospects of a deep qualitative change in the sector
are now ill-defined, and the sectorÕs managers are motivated to
lobby for the maintenance of the status quo, i.e. for the stateÕs
policy of privileging the sector and restricting competition. This
was clearly visible in the privatisation process, which was for-
mally ÔopenÕ and yet de facto closed to investors from ÔoutsideÕ,
especially the West. 
In this way, the restructuring and consolidation of UkraineÕs me-
tallurgy (which has little in common with the consolidation
processes taking place in the worldÕs markets) will continue to
take place around the local industrial-financial groups. In such
a situation, the large Russian concerns are the only potential for-
eign investors. The consolidation of this sector is a process sim-
ilar to the developments taking place in Russia, although it is
several years behind. The Ukrainian IFGs are trying to form
chains of companies that encompass complete production
cycles, and after taking control over particular establishments
they make modernisation investments mainly in those which
export their products. On the one hand, this reduces the risk of
instability of raw material and semi-finished products supplies to
the exporting enterprises within the group, but on the other, it
leads to restriction of competition in the domestic market, and
a widening gap between the levels of modernisation investments
in the key enterprises exporting their products (steelworks, pipe
factories), and the raw material backend (the extraction industry).
The ÔextensiveÕ model of the sectorÕs development preserves the
outdated structure of an economy oriented towards quantity
rather than quality. It also makes this economy strongly depen-
dent on Russia, which remains the most important market for
UkraineÕs producers and the main source of gas supplies (the
importance of which grows in line with the increasing volumes of
industrial production in Ukraine53), and is in fact the only real
investor in Ukraine. This development model also determines 
the direction of the oligarchic political and economic systemÕs
evolution, as the latter has similar roots and a number of shared
characteristics. 
The development model which UkraineÕs metallurgy sector has
been implementing so far and the interdependence of business
and the structures of power are serious barriers that impede not
only the sectorÕs restructuring, but also reforms to the present
political and economic system, of which control over UkraineÕs
metallurgy is a fundamental part. 
Arkadiusz Sarna
This text was completed on March 22, 2002
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48 ÔDonetckie metallistyÕ in Kompanion, 26 September 2000. The steel mill in
Kerch, Crimea, which is controlled by IUD, supplies products for railways in Iran.
(http://www.oaokmk.com/start_r.htm).
49 Pikovski, op.cit., p. 36.
50 IISI. (http://www.worldsteel.org/trends_prod/prod06 
and http://www.worldsteel.org/trends_misc/misc07).
51 Pikovski, op.cit.
52 V. Hurov, op.cit.
53 Ukrainian metallurgy consumes between 9 and 9.5 billion m3 of gas annually
Ð ÔMetallurhy budut dobyvat haz?Õ, PROMETALL, 30 OctoberÐ5 November 2001,
(http://www.prometal.com.ua/analit.php3?n=82&p=01).
Appendix No 1: 
Main industrial and financial groups of Ukraine 
and their political backup








Minister of the Energy sector





Financial sector and others:
Dongorbank, 
the Shakhter Donetsk 
football club Ð enterprise
Media:
ISTV Television, STB, 
11 Telekanal (regional,
DnipropetrovsÕk), 
Fakty i Kommentarii daily
1) The Interpipe Group
Leaders (political affiliation):
Viktor Pinchuk 
(President Leonid Kuchma, 





Financial sector and others:
Kredyt Dnipro Bank,
Kyivstar GSM (leading 
mobile operator)
Media:
Televisions: Inter, Studio 1+1,
daily newspapers:
Den, Kievskiye Vedomosti




(Social Democratic Party 
of Ukraine (united)
Industrial sector:
metallurgy (the Metallurhia 
concern), the oil sector 
(the Slavutych concern), 
the energy sector
Financial sector and others:
Ukrainskyi Kredytnyi Bank,
the Dynamo Kyiv











Sentoza (the oil sector)
THE DNIPROPETROVSÕK CLAN
Appendix No 2: 
Basic figures of the Ukrainian metallurgy
C E S  s t u d i e s
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Table 2. Metallurgy as compared to other sectors of UkraineÕs economy.
Industrial production dynamics in selected sectors in 1990Ð2000
Source: Derzhavnyi Komitet Statystyky Ukrainy
C E S  s t u d i e s
Asia & Pacific
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Table 4. The sectorsÕ shares in the value of sold production of the Ukrainian industry (per cent)
Source: Derzhavnyi Komitet Statystyky Ukrainy
Source: V. Romenets, O. Yuzov, T. Rubinshtein, ÒMetallurhia i rynok metallov stran SNG 





























(per cent of exports)
35.4
33.3
9.4
7.8
7.1
6.5
0.5
100
